Caught by surprise and outnumbered by soldiers with far superior weapons, the Korean defenders were quickly overwhelmed; the port city fell within a few hours 7. Those Korean soldiers who did not die in the battle or who were not captured began to retreat inland in an attempt to reorganize. The first three divisions of troops to land then began a three pronged attack northward across the Korean countryside and advanced rapidly towards the capital of Seoul.
They met very little resistance until they reached Ch'ungju, neary two-thirds of the way to their destination. Here they encountered a reorganized Korean army under the command of war hero General Sin Ip. Although the defenders fought valiantly, General Ip and his soldiers were wiped out.
Their rusty swords were no match against the Japanese soldiers' muskets. The city fell quickly, and the invasion force continued towards Seoul unchecked. Upon receiving this news, King Sonjo abandoned his capital and fled towards Uiju on the Yalu River in northwestern Korea 8.
The small contingent of troops he left behind for the defense of Seoul made a feeble stand along the Han River and was quickly overrun. Korea's capital of Seoul had fallen within three weeks of the start of the invasion 9. It was at this point that Korean Admiral Yi Sun-sin began to make his presence known to the Japanese.
In he had been appointed Left Navy Commander of Cholla Province, charged with protecting Korea's southwest coast. This was considered a very important post, for through these waters flowed the bulk of Korea's grain reserves destined for the large cities of the north. These shipments had been susceptible to Japanese pirate attacks for decades. Given the history of these attacks, and coupled with the possibility of a large-scale Japanese invasion, which Admiral Yi saw as imminent, he began to build up Korea's navy.
Admiral Yi directed the construction of a fleet of modern warships, including one ship that he designed himself, unlike any that the world had ever seen. He called his invention kobuk-son, the turtle ship This turtle ship, so named due to its shape, is considered to be the world's first ironclad battleship; however, there seems to be some disagreement about its exact design.
The ship was lost long ago, and the only clues to its design come from written descriptions of it that are preserved in the Yi Sun-sin Shrine in Asan, Korea. Based on a reconstruction of the ship using these descriptions, its deck appears to have been covered with hexagonal iron plates that were spaced several inches apart from each other In the synopsis to Nanjung Ilgi, the writer says, "all important parts of the hull were covered with protective iron" xxv.
However, the reconstruction shows iron only on the deck of the ship. Another source states that the turtle ship was not an ironclad at all, but that it had a wooden deck "spiked with sharp pieces of metal" Elisonas Although there are conflicting reports as to whether or not the turtle ship was clad in protective iron, there seems to be agreement on other specifications of the ship.
Descriptions do suggest that the ship's deck was studded with long, sharp spikes. These spikes were used to discourage enemies from boarding the ship. Before going into battle, the deck was covered with straw mats to hide the spikes from the enemy. From descriptions of the turtle ship, it was a sturdy, flat bottom, wooden ship with a convex deck.
It was ringed with up to 14 cannons, making it possible to fire in any direction. In addition, there were dozens of small gun ports around each deck that enabled the sailors inside to maneuver the ship and fire at will without being seen from outside.
At the bow of the deck was mounted a figurehead in the shape of a dragon's head with four additional cannons inside of it. These cannons fired bombs of gunpowder and iron pieces while sending up smoke screens that made the ship difficult to pinpoint by Japanese gunners. The ship was equipped with 20 oars, making it possible to outrun any enemy vessel. It measured feet from bow to stern, 28 feet across, and seven feet from the bottom of the boat to the bottom of the top deck.
This was the largest of the turtle ships built, and it was commanded by Admiral Yi himself. Perhaps only four additional smaller ones were built for the war; unfortunately, none of them exist today At the battle of Okp'o, the Admiral's first victory, the Korean navy destroyed 31 out of 50 Japanese ships and only suffered one slight wound to one of its own sailors. Over the course of the next five battles, the Japanese lost 83 ships while the Koreans lost only 11 sailors.
The next two battles, waged over a four-day period, are known together as the Battle of Hansan Island. It is regarded to be one of the three great Korean victories in the struggle against the Japanese In this battle, the Japanese navy lost ships and more than men, as opposed to 19 men lost on the Korean side.
Admiral Yi won his ninth victory at the Battle of Pusan-p'o. His fleet of 92 ships, spearheaded by the turtle ship, encountered Japanese vessels and sunk of them while only losing only seven of his own sailors. A few months later, the Korean navy defeated the Japanese fleet at Ungp'o. It should be pointed out that although the Japanese navy had a far greater number of ships and sailors than the Korean navy had, the Japanese navy was never a match for the superior Korean navy.
The Japanese navy was made up mostly of trading vessels manned by sailors who had been pirates before the war. These men were not experienced with the forms of engagement that they witnessed in the Korean campaigns, and their ships were not equipped for such battles. Also, the Japanese naval commanders were unfamiliar with the waters along Korea's southern coastline, making it difficult for them to maneuver effectively.
On the other hand, the Korean navy was composed of vessels built from knowledge gained while fighting against the Japanese pirates during the previous decades.
Korean naval commanders and sailors also had received valuable training during this period, and their familiarity with the tides, currents, and obstacles of their home waters put them at a great advantage against the Japanese invaders Under the leadership of Admiral Yi, the Korean navy was able to turn the tide of the invasion by cutting off the vital sea routes of the Japanese navy.
Control of the Tsushima Strait and the numerous islets along Korea's southern coast had been an essential element of Hideyoshi's invasion strategy. Achieving this control would have given the Japanese navy access to the Yellow Sea, making it possible to re supply the Japanese troops in Seoul and P'yongyang by water; this would have also made it possible to set up fast communication links between Japan's northern and southern forces.
With Korea in control of its own seas, Japan was forced to commit its navy to defending a narrow supply corridor between Kyushu and Pusan. From Pusan, the Japanese re supplied their northern forces via a precarious land route through central Korea. This method required much greater manpower than the sea route, and the Japanese supply lines were in constant threat of ambush by Korean guerrilla units Within the first three months of the war, the Japanese invasion force had advanced up the Korean peninsula from Pusan in the south to the Yalu River in the north, capturing the major cities of Seoul and P'yongyang and routing the Koreans in every battle.
The beleaguered Korean regular army, lacking leadership and morale, was scattered throughout the countryside into disorganized units.
For a time, Korea was left virtually defenseless. It was at this juncture that a guerrilla movement spontaneously began to develop all over Korea. Koreans from all walks of life joined guerrilla units that formed in their local districts and took up arms in the defense of their homeland. These guerrilla units were composed primarily of farmers and slaves and were typically led by either local gentry or respected Neo-Confucianists.
Each unit generally was made up of a small number of men armed with swords and other light weapons; however, there were hundereds of these units throughout Korea.
Bands of guerrills repeatedly harassed Japanese communication and supply lines and attacked Japanese army columns using hit and run tactics.
By the end of Korean guerrillas had succeeded in pushing the Japanese out of many towns and provinces throughout the country. At times more than one guerrilla unit joined with a reorganized Korean regular army unit to form a formidable host against the Jpanese invaders. In one instance a Korean force that had retaken a strategic fort at Haengju along the Han Rivernear Seoul fought back repeated attacks by a much larger Japanese force.
The Korean victory at Haengju is also remembered to be one of the three great Korean victories against the Japanese. The Korean guerrilla movement that emerged, after the initial gains of the Japanese army, succeeded in stalling the momentum of the invasion and putting the Japanese on the defensive Coupled with the successes of the Korean guerrilla movement was the entrance of the Chinese Ming army into the war.
China finally came to the aid of Korea after repeated please by King Sonjo and after the Japanese army had already reached Korea's border with China. China was somewhat obligated to come to the assistance of Korea because Korea was a vassal state of China.
Also, the threat of an invasion by Japan into China could not be tolerated. The first Chinese relief army of a mere troops arrived in Korea with the aim of retaking P'yongyang and was easily defeated by the Japanese occupiers. China then realized the seriousness of the situation that had developed in Korea, and they began to mobilize a much larger force to deal with the invading Japanese.
In February of , a Ming army of 50, soldiers attacked the Japanese defenses at P'yongyang and succeeded in pushing them all the way to Seoul before the Japanese counterattacked. Thus, a stalemate developed with the Chinese army in control of northern Korea and the Japanese in control of the central portion of the southern part of Korea from Seoul to Pusan.
At this point, informal talks were held between China and Japan, with the exclusion of Korea, to discuss the conditions for peace. After China threatened to send a , man army to Korea, Japan agreed to withdraw from Seoul and most of the Korean peninsula. By May of , Japan retreated to a narrow defensive position along Korea's southern coast around Pusan, and formal peace talks were held.
The peace talks between China and Japan over the fate of Korea were to last four years China began the truce by sending emissaries to Japan to discuss peace between the two countries. General Hideyoshi was under the impression that Japan had won the war, so he gave his representatives at the peace talks a list of conditions for peace that were to be given to the Chinese delegation.
These conditions included that the four southern Korean provinces were to be ceded to Japan, that a daughter of the Chinese emperor was to be wedded to the Japanese emperor, and that a Korean prince and several high ranking Korean officials were to be turned over to Japan as hostages to guarantee that the Korean government would no longer oppose Japan.
Due to political intrigue on both the Chinese and Japanese sides, these conditions were not presented to the Ming emperor. Instead, a forged letter from Hideyoshi was given to the Ming emperor begging for peace and requesting that Japan be recognized as a vassal to China After several years of delay, the Chinese emissaries returned to Japan in the fall of with the reply that the Ming emperor had bestowed on Hideyoshi the title of "King of Japan" and had recognized Japan to be a tributary state of China, with no mention of Japan's list of demands.
This enraged Hideyoshi, as China's message to him was no more than one of Japan's subordination to China; therefore, Hideyoshi made plans for a second invasion of Korea Now, Japanese deputy defense minister has gone to the extent of regarding Taiwan's peace and stability as "Japan's own business. It seems that they have deliberately formed a strategic ambiguity toward the Taiwan question to align with the US cross-Straits policy.
Once such a trend of Japan is formed, it will constitute a serious challenge to China's core national interests A very strong anti-China ideology has been formed in Japan. Japanese radical politicians have led the aggressive sentiment toward China. They are in turn driven by the sentiment, drifting further in the tide of a competition of being tough toward China. Such a competition of sentiment is different from the "anti-Japan" wave among ordinary Chinese people.
Such a performance of Japan is more likely to trigger real consequences and incidents, leading to a further chain reaction in China-Japan relations. As long as there is a chance, Japan will turn to the salami-slicing tactics and highly uncertain how far it will go.
The upcoming presidential election of the LDP has almost turned into a "carnival" of tough performances against China. This wicked neighbor who has repeatedly invaded China in modern times is frantically clamoring a "threat from China. They would believe that Japan's land must have been taken away by China in history since it is so much smaller than that of China. The Chinese and Japanese public hold negative sentiment toward each other.
According to a survey conducted by Beijing-Tokyo Forum at the end of last year, There is no reason for Japanese to have more hatred toward China than the Chinese people do with Japan. Their hatred toward China is morally dirty. Japan has been caught up in the worst geopolitical environment since the Meiji Restoration.
China, which once was far behind Japan, has seen a rise. China's GDP now is three times that of Japan. South Korea is smaller than Japan and once Japan's colony. But it has grown to be a developed country and a challenger to Japan in the technological sector.
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